## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office Invitations to Interview Mr. David Grusch

- 1. The All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) extended multiple invitations to Mr. David Grusch for the purpose of conducting an oral history interview in support of the Congressionally directed Historical Record Report (HRR). Invitations, both direct and through intermediaries, to interview Mr. Grusch regarding his claimed knowledge of U.S. Government possession of extra-terrestrial material and reverse-engineering programs were met with negative results.
- 2. The following attempts were made, by Director, AARO and staff, to encourage Mr. Grusch to provide information to AARO, on the record, and in an appropriately secure environment. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 authorizes AARO to receive reporting about U.S. Government activities and events related to Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP), regardless of classification level or compartmentalization of the information.
- A. Between June 8<sup>th</sup>, 2023 and June 13<sup>th</sup>, 2023, Director, AARO engaged in a dialog with Person (b)(6) regarding AARO's authorities and encouraged Person (b)(6) to have Mr. Grusch contact AARO. Note that Person (b)(6) is a known close associate of Mr. Grusch and the dialog made it clear that Person (b)(6) was in contact with Mr. Grusch.
- B. On June 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup>, 2023, Director, AARO, discussed with a Professional Staff Member (PSM) of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Grusch's refusal to speak with AARO. The PSM stated that he would contact Mr. Grusch and request Mr. Grusch's email address. The PSM made the offer after the Director made it clear that AARO did not have Mr. Grusch's contact information.
- C. On June 26<sup>th</sup>, 2023, AARO staff contacted Interviewee (b)(6) and asked for Mr. Grusch's current telephone number so that an invitation could be extended to Mr. Grusch. Interviewee (b)(6) contacted Mr. Grusch on AARO's behalf and an invitation was rebuffed by Mr. Grusch.
- D. On June 28th, 2023, Director, AARO contacted a PSM with the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after Mr. Grusch's appearance before Congress and asked for any information, reported to Congress by Mr. Grusch, that AARO may be able to verify. The Director also reminded the PSM of the agreement that if a witness expressed apprehension about coming to AARO, that AARO would send a staff member to Congressional spaces to record the information into the U.S. Government record in support of the HRR.
- E. On July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2023, AARO staff conducted an interview of Interviewee (b)(6) who revealed that he would be having dinner with Mr. Grusch the following day. AARO staff, to include the Director, asked Interviewee (b)(6) to invite Mr. Grusch to contact AARO for an interview. AARO staff made it clear that the interview would be conducted in a secure facility, in


accordance with the law, and the tone of the interview would be friendly and non-confrontational, as are all AARO interviews.


- F. On October 6<sup>th</sup>, 2023, AARO staff conducted a secure call and interview with Interviewee and asked that he also encourage Mr. Grusch to agree to a secure interview so that Mr. Grusch's claims might be introduced into the U.S. Government record in support of the HRR. Interviewee (b)(6) is known to be a close associate of Mr. Grusch.
- G. During the previous several months, Director, AARO, asked a PSM with the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services to encourage Mr. Grusch to provide information to AARO during an official interview.
- H. On November 10<sup>th</sup>, 2023, Mr. Grusch contacted AARO, at the urging of Congressional Staff Members, and agreed to be interviewed in Arlington, VA on November 14<sup>th</sup>, 2024. AARO provided Mr. Grusch with a memorandum from the Director of Special Access Programs, Department of Defense that made it clear AARO is authorized to receive compartmented information (Enclosure 1). Mr. Grusch was also told that AARO would obtain a similar memorandum from the Director, Controlled Access Programs Office, Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- I. On November 14<sup>th</sup>, 2023, Mr. Grusch failed to show at the agreed upon location and time for an interview with AARO. Upon contacting Mr. Grusch, he stated that he is not convinced that AARO is authorized to receive varying levels of classified and sensitive information.
- J. On November 19th, 2023, AARO, again contacted Mr. Grusch via email and stated, "We invite you to speak to AARO regarding any U.S. government programs or activities related to unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) dating back to 1945. In accordance with the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, AARO is authorized to receive any information related to UAP regardless of classification, and notwithstanding any nondisclosure agreement you may have signed. We would be glad to meet with you in a SCIF so that you could share information with us." This specific invitation was coordinated with the Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense. Mr. Grusch, again, declined the invitation despite previously agreeing to an interview. And, again, Mr. Grusch cited various security concerns that AARO is authorized to receive information of any classification level regarding UAP.
- K. On January 8<sup>th</sup>, 2024, AARO provided Mr. Grusch with a memorandum from the Director, Controlled Access Programs Office, Office of the Director of National Intelligence that states AARO is authorized to receive information which is subject to a U.S. Government Nondisclosure Agreement (Enclosure 2). AARO also informed Mr. Grusch that there is a standing invitation to be interviewed by AARO regarding his claims of UAP and U.S. Government activity and events.
- 3. During interactions between AARO and Mr. Grusch from November 2023 to January 2024, it became evident that Mr. Grusch had no intention of providing AARO with information regarding his claims. This assessment stands despite the NDAA for FY 2023 and the enclosed memorandums from the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National


Intelligence making it clear that AARO is authorized to receive all levels of information related to UAP.





Enclosures: As stated

















Yeah, but let me ask him first. He has bad blood with Sean going back to 2015. I'll tell him that only you want to talk to him.

Sounds like a plan. Thank you 11:45 PM 🚱



7:25 PM W





From:	David Grusch (b)(6)
Sent: To:	Monday, January 8, 2024 2:44 PM (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: Contact Request
Good Afternoo	on,
Thank you will	review. Please address my specific concerns that I sent via email on 19 Nov 23.
DG	
On Mon. Jan 8 (b)(6)	. 2024. 12:27 PM (b)(6) wrote:
	proces.
Mr. Grusch,	
to AARO and	inversation on November 10 <sup>th</sup> , 2023, we discussed your comfort level with relaying sensitive information the possibility of AARO obtaining a memo from CAPCO that clearly states that AARO can receive CAP similar to the SAPCO memo I provided you). Attached is that memo from the ODNI CAPCO.
Year 2023, AA	to reiterate that in accordance with the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal ARO is authorized to receive any information related to UAP regardless of classification, and ing any nondisclosure agreement you may have signed.
Our invitation	to discuss possible U.S. Government programs, events, or activities related to UAP still stands.
Have a good a	afternoon,
(b)(6)	
From: David (	Grusch (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, To: (b)(6)	November 19, 2023 6:03 PM
	Contact Request

Good Evening,

Thank you for your email. I had expressed specific concerns, both directly via email and through counsel, and those specific concerns have not yet been addressed in writing. Please reference those emails in this chain.

DG

On Sun. Nov 19. 2023, 4:16 PM (b)(6) wrote:

Mr. Grusch,

We invite you to speak to AARO regarding any U.S. government programs or activities related to unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) dating back to 1945. In accordance with the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, AARO is authorized to receive any information related to UAP regardless of classification, and notwithstanding any nondisclosure agreement you may have signed. We would be glad to meet with you in a SCIF so that you could share information with us.

(b)(6)

**AARO** 

From: David Grusch Sent: Tuesday, November 14, 2023 4:35:36 PM To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: Contact Request

Thank you. I apologize for the confusion this morning about my whereabouts. I should been more clear in my email on Monday.

DG

6)	:37 PM (b)(6) wrote:
1r. Grusch,	
le received your emai	l and we will get back to you shortly.
0(6)	
rom: David Grusch (b)(6	
o: (b)(6)	per 14. 2023 10:36 AM
ubject: Re: Contact Re	equest
ARO Staff,	
	need answers to my questions before I will be comfortable meeting. Please provide an hopefully move forward and schedule a meeting.
wners. I have manage	r office need-to-know, but does not establish policies and procedures with various dated multi-compartmented activities throughout my entire career and have multiple DCS.
ecurity professional ce	ertifications. I did not ask these questions for mere curiosity.

From: David Grusch (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, November 13, 2023 12:24:06 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: Contact Request

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Good Morning (b)(6)

Thank you for sending these items. As a former agency-level SAPMO and CAPCO I take security policies very seriously. In the DoD SAPCO memo, the term "UAP-related" is not defined. FY23 NDAA Sec. 1673 Subsection B defines it as the following:

"any activity or program by a department or agency of the Federal Government or a contractor of such a department or agency relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, including with respect to material retrieval, material analysis, reverse engineering, research and development, detection and tracking, developmental or operational testing, and security protections and enforcement."

The key issue here is that many of these activities have conventional classified and compartmented Security Classification Guides that also cover non-UAP activities as well. To discuss the UAP-related activities would also expose these conventional SAP mission areas. An oral history interview subject must also be absolved of this obligation to protect this information as well, some of it may be bigoted or WAIVED (IAW DODI 5205.11 and 10 USC Sec 119).


Furthermore, as discussed Friday, I am seeking a ODNI CAPCO determination to absolve an oral history interview subject of any NDA's relating to UAP-related and adjacent (as stated above) IC CAP information. Additionally, in my particular case, in order to horizontally protect a portion of my oral history testimony previously provided to ICIG and the intelligence committees, we would need to conduct the interview at the HCS-Operations (O) Restricted

Handling (RH) level (IAW DNI CAPCO manual Sec. 4). Has the CIA Office of Security (OS) or Directorate of Operations (DO) provided a memo in this regard for oral history interview subjects? Has the OS provided a memo to also cover managed-need-to-know (MNTK) projects not directly reported to ODNI CAPCO? Lastly, what signed policy does AARO have to receive non-title-10 SAPs (ie, DOE and NSC)? Has the EOP NSC Security Director, Director National Program Management Staff OUSD(I&S), or DOE SAPCO/SAPOC provided a memo similar to the DoD SAPCO memo you provided? v/r, DG On Mon. Nov 13, 2023 at 8:13 AM (b)(6) wrote: Mr. Grusch, Attached are the two items we spoke about: The Verbal Legal Advisement that we review prior to the start of every interview. The MFR from SAPCO that makes it clear that AARO can receive compartmented information from interviewees. I will meet you in the lobby. Our address is See you tomorrow at 1000,

From: David Grusch (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, November 10, 2023 11:05 AM To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Contact Request
Good Morning,
This is for (b)(6) for coordination purposes.
This is for toordination purposes.
Please give me a call to discuss conditions and admin items (b)(6)
V/r,
David Grusch

From: Kirkpatrick, Sean M HQE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6) Sent: Wednesday, November 15, 2023 10:05 AM Subject: FW: Dave Grusch For the records. Please save. Note the opening paragraph at the beginning of this email thread from (b)(6) From: (b)(6) Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 11:27 AM To: Kirkpatrick, Sean M HOE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6)CC: (b)(6) Subject: RE: Dave Grusch You know how things work. He could have heard that a pgm is waived. What do you mean by "you're free to ask"? What UAP-related IG investigation are you referring to? The one on Grusch or the broader review? From: Kirkpatrick, Sean M HQE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 11:24 AM To: (b)(6) Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6) Subject: RE: Dave Grusch He wouldn't know if it was waived if he "found" it, and as I said, I know what he was actually briefed to. I've been told by the IG the UAP related investigation has been closed for a year – he is free to tell us, and you're free to ask. There is no excuse for not providing an authorized disclosure. From: Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 11:19 AM Kirkpatrick, Sean M HQE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b)(6)	Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b)(6)	THE LINE OF THE LOCAL COST OF
Subject: RE: Dave Gro	usch
	taff ANYTHING once he entered the IG process. We are forbidden from even asking. Furthermore, olved, he cannot talk to SASC staff about it because we are not accessed.
From: (b)(6) Sent: Thursday, June	8, 2023 7:50 AM
To: Kirkpatrick, Sean (b)(6)	M HQE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6)
(b)(6)	Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b)(6)	
Subject: RE: Dave Gru	usch
Tracking thanks Sean	!
From: Kirkpatrick, Se	an M HQE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday III	10.00 to 10.
To: (b)(6)	Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD
INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (b)(6)	(6)
(b)(6)	
Subject: Re: Dave Gru	usch
Let me expand a bit.	
DoD SAP that the IC of couldn't be shared. If someone who did he couldn't be shared. If couldn't be shared w	was briefed to and had access to, and have far greater access. So he did not have access to some didn't have (and if he did, he could've told you). Similarly, he didn't have access to some IC CAP that he "found" some program, he wouldn't know who's it was unless he had super user access or lped him look it up. He didn't. Therefore, he can't make the argument that whatever he "found" he or others thought it was an illegal program, then again, he can't make the argument that it ith either the DoD or the IC committees based on his assertion they didn't have clearances. It e playing the two halves against the middle to hide something.
From: '(b)(6)  Date: Wednesday, Ju  To: "Kirkpatrick, Sear  OSD OUSD INTEL & S (b)(6)	ine 7, 2023 at 5:56:19 PM  M HQE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b)(6)  EC (USA)! (b)(6)  Kozik, David A SES
(b)(6)	
Subject: RE: Dave Gru	usch
because they were no	indicate that he said he could not provide everything he knows to the INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES ot cleared, so I concluded that he had access to some DOD SAP that the Intel Committee are not ferred that the IC IG would not have access either.
From: Kirknatrick Se	an M HQE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, Ju	ne 7, 2023 5:50 PM
To (b)(6)	Kozik David A SES OSD OUSD



Subject: Re: Dave Grusch

All-I did speak with the DoDIG. They went on my behalf to the ICIG to request the classified transcript. Why? Because Grusch gave NOTHING to the DoDIG and claimed the same thing he told you - that it was IC compartmented information and they couldn't have it.

The ICIG declined to acquiesce to my request.

I am fairly confident I know what compartments he is referring to, because I did my job, but I cannot confirm 100% if he doesn't come see me.

As DK points out, the SSCI could give me the transcript.

Sean

From: (b)(6)	
Date: Wednesday, June 7, 2023 at 5:41:46 PM	
To: "Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b)(6)  OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6)	"Kirkpatrick, Sean M HQE OSD
OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) <sup>1</sup> (b)(6)	
Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6)	
(b)(6)	

Subject: RE: Dave Grusch

Really helpful, Dave, thanks. Did not know that executive branch folks are in the same boat we are. Will urge Grusch to come through Sean's portal.

From: Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6)	
Sent: Wednesday, June 7, 2023 5:36 PM	
To: (b)(6)	Kirkpatrick, Sean M HQE OSD
OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
Cubicate Dou Davis Crusch	

Subject: Re: Dave Grusch

Weighing in—there's no way in heck that DoD and IC IG will give any third party raw information, ever. IG investigations are a black box for a reason. The best Sean will get from them is a filtered report that the IG releases to everyone.

Bottom line: best COA is still for Mr. Grusch to speak to AARO per their confidential process (the one Congress directed in law). If he doesn't,

I fear the best assessment you will ever get from AARO is a reflection of a reflection. FYI, Sean won't have an access problem, ie he has no SAP/CAP restrictions— it's just the IG divide.

Of course, if he did speak to the intel committees, they could always provide their transcripts/notes to Sean for his review.

My two cents.

VR

From: (b)(6)	
Date: Wednesday, June 7, 2023 at 10:24:52 PM	
To: "Kirkpatrick, Sean M HQE OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b)(6)	'Kozik, David A SES
OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
Subject: Dave Grusch	

Sean: Grusch confirmed to me that he does not intend to avail himself of the AARO "Safe harbor" process to tell you what he spent many hours telling the DoD IG, the IC IG, and the two intelligence committees about UAP. He has reported through the media in recent days that he was not able to share some of the information he has with the two intelligence committees because they lacked the program accesses. Assuming accurate media reporting, that means that he has told either/both DoD/IC IGs about one or more SAPs that the Intel Committees are not accessed to. The Armed Services Committees are not allowed by process rules to interview Grusch about any of this because the IC whistleblower process is tightly controlled by the Intel Committees.

What this means is that the DoD/IC IGs know something from Grusch that Congress as a whole is not aware of. That is a reason for you to go to the IGs and ask for access, as they deem appropriate, for you to what Grusch is reporting. If waived programs are involved, there would need to be a way for you to convey this to our staff directors. But there is also just a basic reason for you to try to get all the information that Grusch has provided to the IGs.

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Tuesday, November 14, 2023 10:34 AM

To:

David Grusch

Subject:

Re: Contact Request

I've been waiting in the lobby over 30 minutes. Are you showing up?

From: David Grusch (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, November 13, 2023 12:24:06 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Re: Contact Request

Good Morning



Thank you for sending these items. As a former agency-level SAPMO and CAPCO I take security policies very seriously. In the DoD SAPCO memo, the term "UAP-related" is not defined. FY23 NDAA Sec. 1673 Subsection B defines it as the following:

"any activity or program by a department or agency of the Federal Government or a contractor of such a department or agency relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, including with respect to material retrieval, material analysis, reverse engineering, research and development, detection and tracking, developmental or operational testing, and security protections and enforcement."

The key issue here is that many of these activities have conventional classified and compartmented Security Classification Guides that also cover non-UAP activities as well. To discuss the UAP-related activities would also expose these conventional SAP mission areas. An oral history interview subject must also be absolved of this obligation to protect this information as well, some of it may be bigoted or WAIVED (IAW DODI 5205.11 and 10 USC Sec 119).

Furthermore, as discussed Friday, I am seeking a ODNI CAPCO determination to absolve an oral history interview subject of any NDA's relating to UAP-related and adjacent (as stated above) IC CAP information. Additionally, in my particular case, in order to horizontally protect a portion of my oral history testimony previously provided to ICIG and the intelligence committees, we would need to conduct the interview at the HCS-Operations (O) Restricted Handling (RH) level (IAW DNI CAPCO manual Sec. 4). Has the CIA Office of Security (OS) or Directorate of Operations (DO) provided a memo in this regard for oral history interview subjects? Has the OS provided a memo to also cover managed-need-toknow (MNTK) projects not directly reported to ODNI CAPCO?

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v/r,

DG

(b)(6)On Mon, Nov 13, 2023 at 8:13 AM (b)(6)

wrote:

Mr. Grusch,

Attached are the two items we spoke about:
The Verbal Legal Advisement that we review prior to the start of every interview.
The MFR from SAPCO that makes it clear that AARO can receive compartmented information from interviewees.
Our address is (b)(6)
See you tomorrow at 1000,
(b)(6)
From: David Grusch (b)(6)  Sent: Friday. November 10, 2023 11:05 AM  To: (b)(6)  Cc: (b)(6)  Subject: Contact Request
Good Morning,
This is for (b)(6) for coordination purposes.
Please give me a call to discuss conditions and admin items:
V/r,
David Grusch

#### UNCLASSIFIED

# OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, DC

CAPCO-23-003

SUBJECT: Authorization to Provide Information to Personnel Representing the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S))

REFERENCE: Section 1673 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

Representatives of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) are authorized to speak to persons and/or conduct interviews of persons that currently have, or previously had, access to sensitive U.S. Government (USG) information, activities, and/or materials.

Individuals with current or previous access to Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP)-related or presumed relevant information which is subject to a USG Nondisclosure Agreement are authorized to provide this otherwise protected information to AARO representatives. AARO personnel are authorized to receive this information pursuant to Section 1673 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2023. The provision of UAP-related information which is subject to a Nondisclosure Agreement to AARO personnel constitutes an authorized disclosure if the information is provided and received for the limited purpose of conducting AARO's assigned mission as specified in Section 1683 of the NDAA for FY2022, as amended by Section 6802 of the NDAA for FY2023.

AARO representatives will conduct any conversation, interview, or disclosure of USG sensitive information by an individual only within appropriate secure spaces and handled in accordance with the regulations applicable to the alleged classification level of the potentially sensitive information discussed, (e.g., if the individual providing the information indicates that he/she believes the information to be shared is classified TOP SECRET//SCI or SAR, the AARO representatives will handle the information in accordance with such level at intake and until the classification can be determined).

Persons in contact with, or interviewed by, AARO representatives are advised that they are to continue safeguarding classified and sensitive information in accordance with U.S. law and the terms of any applicable Nondisclosure Agreement. An individual's authorized disclosure of sensitive information to AARO representatives are outlined in this memorandum in no way impacts that individual's responsibility to protect and safeguard classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director, Controlled Access Programs Central Office



# OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3200 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3200

MAR 0 8 2023

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Authorization to Provide Information to Personnel Representing the All-Domain

Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S))

References: Section 1673 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

- 1. Representatives of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) are authorized to speak to persons and/or conduct interviews of persons that currently have, or previously had, access to sensitive U.S. Government (USG) information, activities, and/or materials.
- 2. Individuals with current or previous access to Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP)-related information which is subject to a USG Nondisclosure Agreement are authorized to provide this otherwise protected information to AARO representatives. AARO personnel are authorized to receive this information pursuant to Section 1673 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2023. The provision of UAP-related information which is subject to a Nondisclosure Agreement to AARO personnel constitutes an authorized disclosure if the information is provided and received for the limited purpose of conducting AARO's assigned mission as specified in Section 1683 of the NDAA for FY2022, as amended by Section 6802 of the NDAA for FY2023.
- 3. AARO representatives will conduct any conversation, interview, or disclosure of USG sensitive information by an individual only within appropriate secure spaces and handled in accordance with the regulations applicable to the alleged classification level of the potentially sensitive information discussed, (e.g., if the individual providing the information indicates that he/she believes the information to be shared is classified TOP SECRET; special access required, the AARO representatives will handle the information in accordance with such a level at intake and until the classification can be determined).
- 4. Persons in contact with, or interviewed by, AARO representatives are advised that they are to continue safeguarding classified and sensitive information in accordance with U.S. law and the terms of any applicable Nondisclosure Agreement. An individual's authorized disclosure of sensitive information to AARO representatives as outlined in this memorandum in no way impacts that individual's responsibility to protect and safeguard classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

DAVID W. ABBA

Maj Gen, USAF

Director, DoD Special Access Program

Central Office