February 5, 2024

The Honorable Kathleen H. Hicks  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
1010 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Dr. Hicks:

Thank you for your letter on September 28, 2023.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agrees to provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with documents and relevant information associated with KONA BLUE. KONA BLUE was a DHS prospective special access program (PSAP) terminated on February 10, 2012. The following actions were taken:

• All DHS documents associated with the KONA BLUE PSAP are declassified and approved for public release.

• The strike-out method was utilized to retain visibility of prior classifications and redactions were made based on policy and legal review.

• All pertinent DHS records have been searched and no additional information associated with the KONA BLUE PSAP has been discovered.

I appreciate your continued cooperation and support for DHS. Should you wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Kristie Canegallo  
Acting Deputy Secretary
(U) Advanced Technology Threat

(U) Project Description

- (TS//KB//NF) This project will investigate, identify and analyze sensitive information, advanced materials and technologies to increase the basic knowledge of potential emerging and/or disruptive scientific and technical data.
- (TS//KB//NF) This project addresses basic, applied, and advanced research and technology demonstrations in order to identify and anticipate threats to the U.S. homeland. A unified approach will be used for data collection and analysis, advanced technology acquisition, applied technology theory demonstration, and consciousness studies.

(U) Planned Research Objectives

(U) All deliverables are dependent on the initial analysis and assessment of associated existing and discovered information and materials.

(U) Describe the potential outcome(s)

- (U//HLVSACO) DHS S&T has the prospect to identify a unique class of scientific and technology threats and opportunities.
- (U//HLVSACO) Achievement of basic research goals will place DHS S&T at the forefront of applied science and opportunities involving advanced technology.
- (U//HLVSACO) Customers/Partners: DHS Components, USG, and private sector.

FY12    FY13    FY14    FY15    FY16    FY17    FY18
Total Funding ($M)  12    25    35-50    TBD    TBD    TBD    TBD
1. **(U) What is the research need?**

**(S//K//NF)** This research is a Congressional interest item.

**(TS//K//NF)** This research addresses the critical need for the United States science and technology community to identify global emerging and/or potentially disruptive technologies that can have a significant impact on homeland security. Based on analytical assumptions and uncertainties, this research is pivotal to defining the impact of global science and technology on the elements for national power and security. The focused collaborations on the knowledge based deliverables ensure that the Departmental requirements, and those of the interagency partners, are addressed and provided opportunities for follow on efforts and additional collaboration on scientific investigation and technology exploitation.

**(TS//K//NF)** The Department’s interest area with this project targets is the scientific and technical investigation, threat analysis, and assessment of materials and data of unique origin, engineering, and purpose. The knowledge gap this research is addressing is emerging or disruptive materials and technologies that can potentially impact national power and security.
2. (U//HYSACO) What is the technical/scientific approach?

(TS//KOB//NF) This research addresses the questions of 1) what emergent technologies and applications are potentially harmful to U.S. vital and major interests; and 2) what vulnerabilities and opportunities does any new technologies present. Successful concept and principal validation provides strategic scientific and technical direction, focus and planning for technological exploitation and solutions, and the strategic planning for countermeasure and mitigation efforts throughout the homeland security enterprise. Specific methodologies used to assess available material, technologies, and observations may require nuanced approaches that which will undoubtedly be of significant interest to foreign intelligence security services.

(TS//KOB//NF) Four research centers – the Data Collection and Analysis Center, the Advanced Technology Center, the Consciousness Center, and the Technology Application Center will investigate and inventory available information and materials, investigate emerging and/or disruptive advanced materials and controls, alternative energy/power source/generation opportunities, temporal translation; human effects and interface, signature reduction and weaponry, as well as technology integration.
3. **(U) What are the anticipated results and value of this research?**

**(TS//KB//NF)** This research is pivotal to identifying the source and substance of associated material and assessments of a previous investigatory USG programs and to identify and define the impact of the unique science and technology applications on homeland security. The exploratory research provides opportunity to increase our basic knowledge of a science or phenomenology. This effort provides the potential to influence technological solutions and strategies to sustain the elements of national power and homeland security.

**(TS//KB//NF)** Success of this research is predicated on the scientific investigation and assessments of available material; continuity of effort can generate 'actionable' follow-on research contributing to continuing discovery, research investments, possible countermeasure technology and USG policy development.

4. **(U) What is innovative about this work?**

**(TS//KB//NF)** This knowledge-based research addresses the analytical assumptions and uncertainties of emerging and disruptive technologies or material that could potentially threaten vital and major U.S. interests such as the security of land, air and sea borders; and citizens; or critical infrastructure or economic resources. The potential also exists that outcomes and follow-on research and evaluation efforts will provide the U.S. with a unique ability to increase any of the elements (political, economic, military, and moral psycho-social (social cohesion)) of national power, as well as enhancing national security and developing resilience to disruptive technology potential.
5. **(U) What are the next steps?**

*(TS//KBR//NF)* This focused research provides an immense opportunity of discovery and validations that are the basis for further community of interest proof-of-principal and proof-of-concept efforts that will determine the strategies for adaptation, countermeasures, and mitigation through applied research initiatives. Follow-on efforts allow for the identification and resource planning and execution for immediate, near-term and far-term technology solutions to monitor and manage risk, for border and security operations and infrastructure protection, exploitation of new techniques and analytical tools also enhance continued research opportunities.

*(TS//KBR//NF)* Due to the advanced nature of the research in this project and security considerations, no defined applied research efforts to this program are specifically identified at this time. However, the research results of this project should be readily used by the Department in the future. There are no known transition concerns at this time.

6. **(U) Are there collaborators or partners involved in this project?**

*(U//IVSACO)* No, not at project inception. There is limited collaboration with the USG and interagency involvement is anticipated.
7. (U) What is the history of this project?

(TS//KB//NF) Advanced Threat Identification Program first sponsored in the FY 2008 Defense Supplemental Act by Senators Reid and Inouye with a $10M add; FY 2010 Defense Appropriations Act included a $12M add for the project.

8. (U) How much funding will be necessary to complete this effort as described?

(S//KB//NF) FY12 (minimum of $12M), FY13 ($25M), FY14 ($35-50M), FY15 – 17 (TBD)
The technical/scientific approach consists of four research centers:

1) Data Collection and Analysis, 2) Advanced Technology, 3) Consciousness, and 4) Integration.

#1 National Institute for Discovery Center:

- The Data Collection Division will collect and deliver reports from the United States regarding sightings, evidence collection and subsequent laboratory analysis on advanced technology behavior within the territorial limits of the United States and immediately-adjacent Pacific and Atlantic Ocean areas.

- The Experimental Division initially will consist of a well-studied experimental location that has been researched for approximately 15 years. The intent is to locate, calibrate and then subject other sites to the same intensive study as the primary location. Within each location, focus remote sensing capabilities on all known hot spots (locations with repeated/frequent reports of activity).

- The Medical Division will have a small team of medical analysts under the direction of the chief physician and the deputy administrator that will organize data into a threat analysis based on medical findings including but not limited to: (a) deaths and injuries as a result of interaction with advanced aerospace vehicles, (b) medical injuries as a result of other anomalies (c) collateral injuries/physiological effects to family members.

- The Data Analysis Division will conduct analysis to technical design and prototyping of AAV performance, up to advanced theoretical and computational studies of multi-physics problems.
**Advanced Technology Threat**

#2 (S//KB//NF) Advanced Technology Center:
- (S//KB//NF) Access recovered advanced technology and any earlier assessments to determine threat capability and any potential countermeasures possible against the advanced technology.
- (S//KB//NF) Collect oral histories from already identified sources – retired military, intelligence, and contractor personnel – to assist in locating additional recovered advanced technology.

#3 (S//KB//NF) Consciousness Center:
- (S//KB//NF) Collect critical data utilizing remote sensing in order to determine the activity and purpose of the advanced technology, especially any threat posed.
- (S//KB//NF) In an expanded role, remote sensing and related techniques may present an invaluable aid in countering illicit activities conducted against the U.S. Demonstrations of capability will be made.

#4 (S//KB//NF) Integration Center:
- (S//KB//NF) Focal point for the integration of information and data from the other centers, and report writing; follow-on basic and applied research proposals and efforts to be identified.
(U) Next Steps:

- U/SST recommendation
- SAPOC member pre-briefs
- SAPOC decision briefing
Back up
Advanced Technology Threat

Points of Discussion:

- Funding Amount/Delivery — Bob H/Mike A discussions; FY12: $12M; FY13: $25M
- Contracts
- SOW
- Facilities:
  - SCIF accreditation in LV; Locations?
- Personnel: cover, ci prog
- DHS (*+1 detailee) What are the requirements? How funded?
- Other: security classification guide
- NCR/Other
- Equipment — comms/IT
Authorities

Technology Readiness Assessment Process. Section 308 (USC 188) an amendment adding:

(d) Technical Risk Assessment Process

(1) In General. The
The following information is presented in accordance with the guidelines contained in Appendix 1 of DHS Instruction 140-04-001, Special Access Program Implementation, 08/13/2009

Question 1. Program Description (Key program objectives/milestones)

The Advanced Technology Threat Program will consist of seven operational centers:

1. Data Collection Center
2. Data Analysis Center
3. Advanced Technology Center
4. Experimental Centers
5. Consciousness Center
6. Medical Center
7. Education Center

Declassified by: Richard D. McComb
DHS, Chief Security Officer
Declassified on: 20230718

Overall key program objectives and milestones for each center are as follows:

- **Data Collection Center**
  - Develop Internet-based site(s) for advanced aerospace vehicle reporting
  - Expand existing data warehouse (200,000 reports)
  - Deploy in-house investigators on select cases
  - Operate liaison center for cooperation with state, local, tribal police, and FBI

- **Data Analysis Center**
  - *Coordination center (hub) of all other centers*
  - Maintain in-house technical, computational, and laboratory facilities capable of physics, chemistry, biology, and engineering analyses

- **Advanced Technology Center**
  - Analyze recovered technology in collaboration with major aerospace and electronics Companies
  - Set up protocols for obtaining access to materials newly acquired
  - Operate an assessment team consisting of the best scientists and engineers available to the government
  - Collect retirees' oral histories on recovered technology and present location
Experimental Centers

Determine geographical locations within the U.S. where anomalous activity occurs on a
- Experimental Centers
  - Determine geographical locations within the U.S. where anomalous activity occurs on a regular basis
  - Subject at least two of the best locations to intense sensor and human observation study while monitoring activity at others

Consciousness Center
- Expand on remote viewing and remote communication to communicate, retrieve data, and transport across dimensional/space-time barrier
- Develop remote viewing countermeasures
- Study consciousness interactions with, and control of, technology

Medical Center
- Study physiological and psychological effects of interaction with vehicles and anomalous phenomena

Education Center
- Develop volunteer corps (expenses reimbursed) to support the collection efforts of the Data Collection Center
- Continue to maintain the world's largest libraries on advanced aerospace vehicles and associated phenomena

Question 2

2. Justification for Need

a) Remote vision, remote communication, and de/re-materialization techniques to observe, communicate, retrieve data, and transfer matter across dimensional and space-time barriers will undoubtedly be of utmost interest if not a top collection priority for adversarial intelligence/security services. Countermeasures against such techniques would also be a collection priority.

b) Recovered AAV technology exists in and is accessible only within a SAP construct.
c) Retrieval and integration of historical data from high value personnel with knowledge of recovered AAV technology and present location of recovered material is accessible only within a SAP construct.

d) Undue attention by other United States government, or private sector entities, not involved with the program, or any international interest, will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily program mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.

e) Due to the highly specialized nature of the program, overt acknowledgement of personnel involved in the program will lead to unnecessary security risks.

f) Without the appropriate SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise of specific features of this program, namely those in a) and b), would result in grave consequences, perhaps irreversible, to the security of the United States.

**Question 3**  Budget Proposal

TBD

**Question 4**  Total Number of Personnel to be Accessed

Fifteen

**Question 5**

Significant program events, milestones, and goals for FY 2012-2013 are as follows:

**Introduction**

The following is a broad Program structure to address the Advanced Aerospace Vehicle (AAV) problem with regard to potential threat. The structure consists of two primary components, or Centers:

(1) an *Advanced Technology Center* that addresses evaluation and exploitation of advanced technological hardware and associated documentation obtained to date and,
(2) an Experimental Centers effort to address the gathering of further data concerning AAV and related anomalous phenomena from specific geographical sites on the basis of site-monitoring.

In support of this proposed two-pronged focus, a number of additional Centers are required:

- Data Collection Center
- Data Analysis Center
- Consciousness Center
- Medical Center
- Education Center

1. Data Collection Center

- Develop Internet-based site(s) for advanced aerospace vehicle (AAV) reporting.

- Expand the current data warehouse (which currently comprises 11 separate databases with over 200,000 AAV reports, the vast majority of which occurred after 1947) by expanding case numbers within each of the eleven databases.

- Utilize multiple teams of in-house investigators to investigate eye witness cases involving AAV technology with the following criteria: (a) more than one eyewitness (b) less than 600 feet from witness (c) physical evidence (traces on ground/vegetation), (d) electromagnetic effects, (e) physiological/pathological effects.

- Expand the investigative equipment inventory necessary to fully equip expanded investigative teams. (The in-house equipment inventory will be itemized upon request).
• Utilize selected investigations from other professional groups with experience in AAV investigations. This will increase data collection coverage of these events in the United States.

• Expand liaison center with rural law enforcement (highway patrol, sheriff departments, police departments), US Coastguard (under DHS auspices), US border surveillance (under DHS auspices), US Fish and Wildlife Service (under Department of Interior), Park Game wardens (under National Park Service) and Federal Aviation Administration (current system includes all air traffic control and commercial/private aircraft pilots).

Deliverables:
• Internet-site and master data warehouse.

2. Data Analysis Center

• Upgrade the database analysis capabilities to maximize "searchability", pattern determination, and predictive analyses.

• Expand in-house photographic analysis capabilities (also including, but not limited to, Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) analysis).

• Maintain technical, computational, and laboratory facilities capable of physics, chemistry, biology, and engineering (electrical, materials, nuclear, etc.) analyses.

• Data analysis exchange with AFOSI. Discuss joint collection and analysis of:

1. Historical and recent cockpit recordings and ECM recordings from Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army.

2. Records, reports, raw data and threat analyses pertaining to (but not limited to): advanced aerospace vehicle tracking by any agency or armed
service within CONUS, all data from Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Lunar and Mars associated data (both historical and contemporary) from NASA, satellite data on unknown targets from NRO, other uncorrelated imagery data from NGIA, trajectory tracks of uncorrelated targets from NORAD/NORTHCOM/MIT Lincoln Labs etc., radar track records of uncorrelated targets from FAA and all data (historical and contemporary) pertaining to interactions/sightings of advanced aerospace vehicles at missile sites, nuclear weapons storage facilities, and at Air Force bases in CONUS.

3. Advanced aerospace technology activity/behavior in other countries, particularly Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

Deliverables:

* Monthly case reports and analyses. Special reports on historical data analyses.

3. Advanced Technology Center

The mission of the Advanced Technology Center is to establish a comprehensive program:

* First to gain access to and inventory all existing caches of Advanced Aerospace Vehicle (AAV) materials and documentation within CONUS, whether residing in archive storage or under active program investigation in National Laboratories, government organizations and/or contractors;

* Secondarily to set up protocols for obtaining access to materials newly acquired from sources both domestic and foreign;

* Finally, a program of evaluation based on the best of modern technological assessment teams and tools.

A dedicated management team will be set up to guide and oversee program actions:
• An in-house staff to perform technical assessment and analysis of both hardware and documentation will be established.

• Well-equipped, secure storage and laboratory facilities will be provided for in-house investigation and evaluation activities.

• In addition to in-house technical efforts, a program will be established to harness the talents of specialists with required expertise on an as-needed basis via both the use of in-house sabbaticals and outsourcing of subcontracts. Of special interest in this category is contact with military personnel and contractors presently (or retirees previously) involved in AAV evaluation programs.

• A full-time support staff to administer and expedite the above requirements will be established.

Deliverables:

• An inventory of AAV hardware, materials and documentation suitable for archiving under appropriate security conditions in a database format will be established.

• Based on the identification of, and negotiation with, present holders/stewards of AAV hardware, materials and documentation, governmental or privatized, protocols for information sharing and access will be developed.

• While the above infrastructure is being established, teams of investigators will begin a process to prioritize 'low-hanging fruit' vs. 'long-range potentials' with regard to possible disruptive-technology exploitation and/or threat potential, in the hands of a potential adversary, with assessment reports provided.

• Based on the assessment process, a number of actions will be set in motion:
(1) Where relevant, updated (re)examination of materials with the best of forensic technologies now available will be pursued, either in-house or at appropriate facilities under appropriate security.

(2) Based on identification of possible advanced technological processes being exploited, experts with the relevant expertise will be engaged to provide useful evaluative input, either indirectly on the basis of being asked to generate position or research papers on the forefront aspects of the (apparent) identified technology (including best-guess extrapolation to potential future developments), or directly by exposure to, and examination of, the materials or technological processes involved. Either could involve re-engagement of entities previously involved in earlier programs to assess such materials and technologies.

(3) Where deemed potentially of merit, in-house or outsourced laboratory experimentation will be initiated to explore as-yet- unidentified characteristics and functions of AAV materials and devices in the inventory, and results reported.

(4) Supplemental to (3) above, additional experimentation will be undertaken, in-house or outsourced, to test various hypotheses that emerge from examination of AAV materials and documents, medical studies of injuries, and AAV sighting reports, and results reported.

(5) Enhance investigations to pursue attempts by foreign countries (particularly China/Russia) in developing advanced technology breakthroughs from recovered technology items. Develop threat assessment based on this information.

In support of the above activities, a well-structured Oral History Initiative will be undertaken both to compile a dense database of information acquired to date, and to assist in identifying additional sources for information acquisition, whether it be the identity of individuals, contractors or government units and activities, foreign as well as domestic.

Over past decades a number of high-level individuals in the military, intelligence, and even
political sectors of our government have had various level of exposure/access to this subject area. This has included agency directors, members of the JCS and very senior individuals in the Executive Branch. To this can be added certain foreign heads of state, as well as select members of the government contractor community in the electronics and aerospace sectors. Oral histories from individuals of the caliber referenced above are critical to this mission.

- Data collection from an already identified and calibrated list of retired, previously highly placed government, armed services, contractor and intelligence community individuals. The oral history project will include gathering all information pertaining to the location of advanced aerospace technology and biological samples, including records, files, reports, photographs, as well as physical samples.

4. Experimental Centers

A well-studied experimental location exists that has been researched for approximately 15 years. The intent is to subject at least two other locations to the same intensive study as the primary location.

The mission of the Experimental Centers is to establish a comprehensive program that:

- Initiating development of a catalog of geographical locations within the U.S. (including the aquatic and space environments) where Advanced Aerospace Vehicle (AAV) and related anomalous activity occur with a level of repeatability that merits consideration for site-monitoring studies.

- Assembly and deployment of suites of sensor components and instrumentation capable of providing all-band detection and recording of environmental variables at the sites of interest. Land-based examples would include such technical monitoring as registration of atmospheric conditions, acoustic background, electromagnetic field activity, broadband radiation including IR, visible, and UV portions of the spectrum, gravitational perturbation signals, radiation readings and ground traces, and so forth. Furthermore, where relevant, inputs from regional radar and satellite imagery are to be included.
In addition, biosensors, especially human observation and detection in all perception formats, constitute a key ingredient of the overall observational menu of activity and are therefore to be integrated.

Multiple biological samples will be collected from these locations and subjected to genetic, biochemical, toxicology, material science, and other analyses.

Finally, a program of evaluation based on the best of modern assessment tools and personnel is to be applied.

A dedicated management team will be set up to guide and oversee program actions:

Sensor components and instrumentation for site-monitoring activities will be completely calibrated, tested and characterized in advance of deployment, and personnel assigned to site-monitoring activities will be trained in their use.

Given past evidence of human psychophysiological observation/detection in all forms, what might be labeled integrative perception, such perception constitutes a major component of the detection and registration of anomalous as well as mundane signals - thus the use of human observers as 'biosensors' will be incorporated as a major component of the overall site-monitoring efforts; of some interest is whether individuals exposed to phenomena at site locations experience continuing effects as they relocate away from the sites under observation.

Where necessary, security guards will be deployed to monitor and protect observation sites.

Data analysis center staff will perform technical assessment and analysis of site information gathered.

In addition to in-house-generated site-monitoring and evaluation efforts, a program component will be established to harness the talents of specialists with useful expertise on an as-needed basis via both the use of in-house sabbaticals and outsourcing of subcontracts.
• If possible, results obtained by other research groups or centers, foreign and domestic, will be evaluated and integrated into the information flow.

• A full-time support staff to administer and expedite the above requirements will be established.

Deliverables:

• A continuously-updated, detailed compilation of site-monitoring activities, observations, results and analyses in the form of documentation suitable for archiving in a database format will be established.

• Separate from technical-measurement reports, detailed logs/oral histories transcribed from notes or interviews of human observers engaging the AAV phenomena in any modality will be collected and entered into the database.

• Based on identification of, and negotiation with, present stakeholders for the type of information being developed, governmental or privatized, protocols for information sharing and access will be developed. A critical example will be sharing of data on field measurements with the Medical Center component of the overall program to assist in their assessment of causes of medical injury resulting from near-field exposure to the AAV phenomena under study.

• As results emerge from the above activities, an analysis team will focus on assessing specifically the potential disruptive-technology exploitation and/or threat nature of what is being observed, if in the hands of (and under the control of) a potential adversary, and assessment reports provided.

Based on the assessment process, a number of actions will be set in motion:

(1) Where required, continually-updated suites of instrumentation with the best of forensic technologies available will be deployed at monitoring sites under appropriate security and protection.

(2) In addition, continually-updated protocols for human observation strategies will be
implemented as well.

(3) Based on identification of possible advanced technological (including psychophysical) processes being observed, experts with relevant expertise will be engaged to provide useful evaluative input, either indirectly on the basis of being asked to generate position papers on the forefront aspects of the (apparent) identified processes (including best-guess extrapolation to potential future developments), or directly by exposure to, and examination of, the information generated concerning the processes involved.

(4) Where deemed potentially of merit, in-house or outsourced laboratory experimentation will be initiated to explore on an independent basis hypotheses generated by the information in hand, and results reported.

In support of the above activities, a well-structured Oral History Initiative will be undertaken similar to that described above, both to compile a dense database of information acquired to date, and to assist in identifying additional sources for information acquisition concerning possible experimental locations, whether it be individuals, groups, contractors or government units and activities, foreign as well as domestic.

5. Consciousness Center

The Consciousness Center manages the acquisition, training, and utilization of remote viewers and communicators. These unorthodox techniques may prove to be critical collection methods for supplementing efforts within the Data Collection, Advanced Technology, and, especially, the Experimental and Medical Centers.

- Develop training and quality assessment program for consciousness studies.
- Conduct assessments both remotely and on-site.
- Conduct assessments with both experts in field and newly trained personnel.
UNCLASSIFIED

As an initial study, focus capabilities on all known hot spots (locations with repeated/frequent reports of activity).

Extend remote communication programs to communicate and retrieve data across dimensional/space-time barrier.

Develop remote viewing and remote communication countermeasures.

Study consciousness interactions with, and control of, technology.

Conduct experiments to determine baseline parameters for physical transport across dimensional/space-time barrier (as opposed to communication and data transfer only).

Deliverables:

Experimental results and assessment reports will be produced on each separate activity. Results and reports will be maintained separate from other data reports.

6. Medical Center

Create comprehensive database on all physiological and medical effects of advanced aerospace vehicles (AAVs) within the United States. The database will have pattern analysis and correlative capabilities.

Create rapid response team of in-house physician-scientist personnel that, under the supervision of contract physician and deputy administrator, can rapidly conduct MRI (3 Tesla) scans, rapidly conduct appropriate blood tests (chemistry, hematology, toxicology, immune system), genetic tests (including tissue biopsies, blood sampling), cytogenetic analysis and full forensic internal medicine diagnostic procedures and integrate the data into a "big picture" description of the putative aerospace vehicle associated injury. Since to date, some evidence points to non-ionizing (EM) radiation associated injuries, emphasis will be on rapid reaction and timely sampling utilizing the above described and other appropriate tests.
• The rapid response medical team as described above will also monitor and test family members in the aftermath of AAV interactions.

• An in-house PhD psychologist will conduct appropriate cognitive and other tests on individuals involved in the Medical Center research. This will include but will not be limited to: (a) individuals who have had experiences on any of the properties described in Experimental Centers above, (b) individuals who have had close encounters with AAVs with physiological/medical effects, and (c) family members of either of these groups who have reported subsequent physiological/medical effects.

• The medical team will be responsible for continuous monitoring of personnel and their family members deployed on experimental facilities.

• Expand and reconfigure current preliminary correlation project between known AAV associated injuries / physiological effects and ICD-9 subtypes.

• Create the internal infrastructure, organization and personnel as well as contract research experts to handle, examine and research unusual and unique biological specimens at the forensic, anatomic, physiological, biochemical, and genetic levels. Such data also will be systematized and integrated.

• Infrastructure will conform to all HIPAA and human subjects regulations as they pertain to the above Medical Center objectives.

• Create comprehensive database on physiological and medical effects of advanced aerospace vehicles in other countries. The database will have advanced pattern analysis and correlative capabilities.

Deliverables:

(1) The databases.

(2) Utilizing the database, a small team of medico-analysts under the direction of the chief physician and the deputy administrator that will organize the data into a
threat analysis based on medical findings including but not limited to: (a) deaths and injuries as a result of interaction with advanced aerospace vehicles, (b) medical injuries as a result of other anomalies, (c) collateral injuries/physiological effects to family members.

7. Education Center

To enhance Data Collection Center capabilities, volunteers can be recruited and trained to assist.

- The Education Center will provide in-house investigative training to these volunteers.

- These volunteers can provide initial data collection capability within their state or immediately adjacent states.

- As needed, these volunteers can also assist the in-house investigative teams for operations conducted in their local area, plus provide an in-depth knowledge resource of events also occurring nearby.

- Expenses incurred by these volunteers, such as use of personal autos, car rental, hotels, food, etc., would be reimbursed. Additional expenses incurred to attend in-house training, such as plane fare, would also be reimbursed.

- This large (>100) volunteer corps would greatly enhance Data Collection Center performance.

- The Education Center could also provide supplemental training for the conducting of collection seminars at local libraries and colleges by these volunteers.

- The Education Center is also responsible for maintaining the world's largest libraries on AAV technology and associated phenomena. On a case-by-case basis,
these libraries may be made available to the academic community for reference material in the writing of a master's thesis or doctoral dissertation.

Question 6

[Redacted]

Question 7

A new five building (small 1 and 2 story) complex in Las Vegas, NV is available. One building in the complex is a five-thousand square foot building containing a 1250 square foot area (2 rooms) in the latter stages of SCIF accreditation. Another building is outfitted as a five-thousand square foot laboratory. The building complex is owned by [Redacted] and has never been occupied.

A single two story building in Las Vegas, NV is available for the use of the Data Collection Center and the Educational Center. One room is certified for TS storage by DSS. The building is owned by [Redacted] and is currently unoccupied.

A four hundred eighty-acre research property in Utah with a fifteen year history of intensive anomalous activity is owned by [Redacted] The property is under 24/7 armed guard.

Question 8. Proposed Classification Guidance
TBD

TBD

Question 10. Relationship to Other SAPs/MOU/MOA
TBD

Question 11. Certification that SAP will be conducted in conformance with all applicable laws, etc.

Question 12. Certification the SAP does not conflict with any mission responsibility of
DHS

13. Two Word Designator for the Program
KONA BLUE

TBD
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July 11, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Tara O'Toole, Under Secretary for Science & Technology
FROM: Mr. Joel Wall, Director, Special Projects Office
SUBJECT: Establishment of a DHS Science & Technology “Prospective: Special Access Program (PSAP)” (U)

REFERENCE: DHS Instruction Number 140-04-001, Special Access Program Implementation, 08/13/2009

(TS/KD/AF) In accordance with authority provided to you by reference above and in coordination with the Special Access Program Control Office (SAPCO), I am requesting that you, as an Original Classification Authority, approve the creation of KONA BLUE as a DHS Science & Technology Prospective Special Access Program. The purpose of KONA BLUE is to investigate, identify and analyze sensitive advanced materials and technologies and to assess potential emerging and/or disruptive scientific and technical data necessary in support of national security.

(TS/KD/AF) Your approval will: 1) appoint myself as program manager for the KONA BLUE Special Access Program; 2) require me to prepare, in coordination with the SAPCO, the documentation listed in Attachment 1 of the reference listed above and 3) require me, in coordination with the SAPCO, to develop KONA BLUE final approval documentation for presentation to the Special Access Program Oversight Committee (SAPOC) within 90 days of the date of this memorandum.

[Signature]

Approve/date ______________________ Disapprove/date ______________________

Modify/date ______________________ Needs discussion/date ______________________

Coordination: SAPCO Date 11/7/11

Classified By: Under Secretary for Science & Technology (OCA) DHS-003-6-0001/11
Class Reason: 1.4 (e) Copy 1 of 1
Declass On: 20360425 1 Page
MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (SAPOC)

SUBJECT: Minutes of the November 21, 2011 SAPOC Meeting (U)

Attendees:

SAPOC Membership
   Jene H. Lute – Chair
   Caryn Wagner – Under Secretary for I&A
   Rafael Borras – Under Secretary for Management
   Ivan Fong – General Counsel
   Gregory Marshall – Chief Security Officer
   Steven J. Cover – Chief, SAPCO (Executive Secretary)

Special Access Program Control Office (SAPCO)
   Michael S. Zawasky, OSAPCO Program Security Officer
   Allen W. Olsen – OSAPCO, Program Security Officer

Component SAP Representatives
   Dr. Tara O’Toole, Under Secretary for Science & Technology

Agenda

- Welcome
  - Opening Remarks – (S2)
  - S & T Request for Approval of KONA BLUE (S/K/B/N/P)

Meeting Minutes

- (U) The meeting officially convened at 7:45am, November 21, 2011.
- (TS/K/B/N/P) The Deputy Secretary opened the meeting with an explanation of what caused this meeting to occur with some sense of urgency which was the impending transfer of funds to DHS from Senators Reid and Lieberman to conduct the KONA BLUE program.
- (TS/K/B/N/P) The entire meeting was devoted to the discussion of the KONA BLUE program and included round table discussions of the following major points of interest:
  - (TS/K/B/N/P) Dr. O’Toole proceeded to discuss what she knew of the history of the KONA BLUE program while it was being conducted at DIA and discussed the technology as she knew it. She also stated that the Senators were prepared to provide $10M for the execution of this program in the FY12 budget. Dr. O’Toole was asked
why the FBI specifically was not approached to do this program. She answered that FBI had no organic capability to do research & development in the scientific arena.

- **(FOUO)** The discussion then shifted to what the rationale was for making the program a Special Access Program. The General Counsel said

- **(FOUO)** A brief discussion was also held concerning why DHS was selected to conduct this research. Dr. O'Toole explained that the Senators felt that the technologies involved effected the security of the United States and was more than worthy of further investigation. Dr. O'Toole explained that there is very serious science involved with this program and that she felt the US Government had the responsibility to continue its investigation. She further stated that if only a small portion of the research provided viable results for DHS application it would be worth it.

- **(SA/KNAP)** A discussion concerning “collection” also occurred in which the U/S I&A felt that S&T didn’t have the authority to conduct. The discussion centered around whether the KONA BLUE program is actually an intelligence program which DIA no longer had the authority to conduct per Executive Order 12333 or whether the “collection” of information in this case was merely the assimilation of data provided willfully with the full knowledge, consent and understanding from those which provided the data. Data in the sense of the KONA BLUE program is neither covertly nor clandestinely collected as is the norm in intelligence programs.

- **(SA/KNAP)** Finally the S2 tasked Dr. O'Toole and Mr. Cover with preparing a 5-10 page paper that fully documents how we got to where we are now with the KONA BLUE program, it’s provenance (history) while at DIA, and exactly what science would be researched that had applicability to the DHS mission. S2 is still not certain of what the “It” is in the program or otherwise what exactly we are researching. She also stated that some kind of formal request to DHS to accept this program and the associated funding would be very helpful.

**Action Items**

- Dr. O'Toole (U/S S&T) and Mr. Cover (DHS SAPCO) were tasked with preparing the paper discussed above as soon as possible.

- The meeting adjourned at 8:50am, November 21, 2011.
SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM CONTROL OFFICE (SAPCO) (U)

DECISION BRIEFING

for the

SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (SAPOC) (U)

November 21, 2011
S & T Request to SAPOC

Approval of **KONA BLUE**
KONA BLUE (TS//KB//NF)

CURRENT ISSUES/STATUS
- Need to finalize DHS SAP Finance System
- Need non-DHS SAP space for program office
- Need to accredit contractor spaces
- Need Comms equipment and dedicated IT support
- Need to further identify Critical Program Information (CPI)

PURPOSE
- **KONA BLUE** is a DHS, Science & Technology UNACKNOWLEDGED O&S SAP
- To investigate, identify and potentially exploit sensitive advanced aerospace-related technology and to prevent disclosure of scientific, technical and engineering data vital to the US
- Program Manager Joel Wall, S & T, Special Programs Division

BUDGET $$ & SCHEDULE
- Expected amount for funding expected to be 12 to 15m
Pending Issues for KONA BLUE (S//KB//NF)

- Funding
  - Classified Line Item in CSO budget
  - USM has concurred in the need to establish a Business/Administrative SAP to handle primarily "unacknowledged" monies (e.g., KONA BLUE)

- Issues After Funding & Approval
  - Stand-up of an "off-site" program office
  - Personnel
    - Additional FTEs required. SAPCO expects to assign two security professionals (PSO-GS14 & APSO-GS9/12) full time to support this program
    - SAPCO has two personnel losses in the month of December
    - One additional FTE to support OSA/Cyber
Declassified by: Richard D. McComb, DHS, Chief Security Officer, Declassified 20230718

Program History and Background of Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program:

(U) In May of 2008, Senators Reid, Inouye (HI), Stevens (AK) invited [redacted] Program Manager with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to meet with them to express their interests to establish a research program plan involving ‘exotic sciences’. In July of 2008, LTG Maples, Director of DIA, was briefed by Senator Reid to discuss a congressional add of $10M in startup funds for FY08 for the proposed effort. A Request for Proposal was issued by DIA and a contract was awarded to Bigelow Aerospace to research advanced aerospace threats and technologies. The focus of the contracted research was within 12 aerospace related areas. Deliverables to the two year contract, with a total funding of $22M, were 38 research papers, an active, searchable database (now with greater than 100,000+ entries), and numerous investigative cases of the observed anomalies; Senator Reid had also requested that the DIA contract effort provide confirmation of observed physical and psychological phenomenon by government personnel.

(U) In June 2009, Senator Reid communicated to the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn, a request to provide Restricted SAP read-on to the DIA program aspects involving the methodologies used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer any advanced technologies associated with the program; the allocation of personnel, support, and oversight; and, engineering application. See Encl 2. Correspondence from Senator Reid to the Honorable William Lynn, Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 24 June, 2009.

(U) In a December 2009 meeting, LTG Burgess, Director of DIA and former DoD Deputy Sec. William Lynn communicated to Senator Reid that the DIA program could not be conducted by the Intelligence Community due to its potential growth. In addition, per an (undated) Info Memo, Subject: Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program/U-10-2552/CE, from LTG Burgess to DoD U/S for AT&L, it was cited that the initial effort was insufficient to classify the program or establish a special access program and recommended that the program could be better suited for another agency or component. See enclosure 3, Info Memo, Subject: Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program/U-10-2552/CE, from LTG Burgess to DoD U/S for AT&L. At the conclusion of the initial two year program in December 2010, the research data was put into contractor-secured storage.

(U//FOUO) In April of 2011, [redacted] presented a program briefing to Mr. Joel Wall, DHS S&T, Director, Special Projects Office, and Mr. Steve Cover, DHS Management, Director, Special Access Programs Control Office, inviting DHS to expand the depth of research involving the analysis of the compiled data repository and on-going recording of observable anomalies reiterating Senator Reid’s desire to transition the program into a special access program to enable access to data and material held by other government and industry entities.


UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Proposed S&T Directorate Statement of Objectives.

(U) Project Purpose

(S//NOT TO BE RELEASED) DHS S&T will provide program management support for a Congressional interest item which will entail the scientific analysis of a body of sensitive information and observed anomalies to identify and anticipate potential threats and opportunities to the U.S. homeland. The S&T Special Projects office will provide program management for 12 months to allow the compilation, review, and assessment of associated unclassified and classified archived data and available literature, data bases, and physical materials from previous government and private entity efforts in order to assess possible research and development thrusts related to potential threats to national security and opportunities to enhance national security. Upon completion of the year one effort, a DHS research council, to be established, will review all findings and provide a recommendation as to whether continued DHS involvement supports the Department’s and the S&T Directorate’s focus and mission requirements. Until a recommendation regarding any efforts after the 12 month period, the performers will provide quarterly reports and briefings to the program office and DHS research council.

(U) Project Plan

(S//NOT TO BE RELEASED) Data to be reviewed and assessed that is associated with the proposed program is available from the previous government managed effort. Material has also been acquired through various sources since the DIA program ended in December 2010. For example, on-going observations and recording of anomalies observed at sites at the Bigelow Ranch in Utah, the San Juan Valley in Colorado, and Marley’s Woods in Missouri. Additional relevant classified material is believed to exist within other governmental special access programs and will be accessed for this effort. Much of this material has been collated into an active and searchable database maintained by the former National Institute of Discovery Science, a data compilation and analysis function of the former government program.

(S//NOT TO BE RELEASED) The Special Projects Office will provide program management through a government Program Manager (PM) and Technical Manager (TM) who will ensure oversight of unclassified and classified data collection and analysis centers, to be located in Las Vegas, Nevada; and classified data analysis centers to be located in Austin, TX and in the National Capital Region; locations at which classified work is necessary will have access to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).

Prepared by:
Joel D Wall, DHS, S&T, Special Projects Office. 23 Nov 2011

UNCLASSIFIED
The DHS S&T Directorate will also establish a research council of a minimum of five eminent independent scientists, with clearances who will monitor and advise the research efforts. The research council will also review all findings during the 12 month project and provide a recommendation as to whether continued DHS involvement supports the Department’s and the S&T Directorate’s focus and mission requirements. Should this effort exceed 12 months, the research council will be responsible for identifying the follow-on research plan that will focus the program’s efforts to support DHS homeland security requirements.

**Proposed Budget**

Based on program funds estimated to be $10M, $2M will support the four program office personnel and equipment to support two leased SCIFs. The remainder $8M will support the data collection and analysis centers.

**Proposed Timeline** [dependent on projected receipt of FY12 funding during FY12 1Qtr]

**FY12 2Qtr:**
- Establish Program Office
- Establish and secure data analysis centers
- Establish sensitive compartmented information facilities
- Initiate data inventory
- Establish Research Council

**FY12 3Qtr:**
- Continue data inventory
- Initiate data analysis
- Implement Research Council review
- Conduct quarterly review

**FY12 4Qtr:**
- Continue data analysis
- Conduct Research Council review

**FY13 1Qtr:**
- Continue data analysis
- Conduct quarterly review
- Conduct Research Council Review

Prepared by:
Joel D Wall, DHS, S&T, Special Projects Office, 23 Nov 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Secretary Lute
FROM: Dr. Tara O'Toole,
Under Secretary for the Office of Science & Technology
SUBJECT: KONA BLUE, Establishment of DHS Science & Technology Directorate SAP
REFERENCE: DHS Instruction Number 140-04-001, Special Access Program Implementation, 08/13/2009

(U) Purpose

(TS/REL/DF) This memo provides information concerning KONA BLUE, a DHS Science & Technology (S&T) Prospective Special Access Program (P-SAP) with a recommendation for your approval of KONA BLUE as a DHS S&T Special Access Program (SAP).

(U) Background

(NAVY) In May 2008, Senators Reid, Inouye (HI), Stevens (AK) invited [redacted] Program Manager with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to meet with them to express their interests to establish a research program plan involving 'exotic sciences.' In July of 2008, LTG Maples, the Director of DIA, was briefed by Senator Reid to discuss the proposed effort. A Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued by DIA and a contract was awarded to Bigelow Aerospace to research advanced aerospace threats and technologies. The focus of the contracted research, named the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification (AATI) Program, was within 12 aerospace related areas. Deliverables for the two year contract, with a total funding of $22M, were 38 research papers, an active, searchable database (now with greater than 100,000+ entries), and numerous investigative cases of the observed anomalies. At the conclusion of the initial two year program in December 2010, the research data was put into contractor-secured storage.

(TS/REL/DF) In April of 2011, [redacted] presented a program briefing to Mr. Joel Wall, DHS S&T, Director, Special Projects Office (SPO), and Mr. Steve Cover, DHS Management, Chief, Special Access Programs Control Office (SAPCO), inviting DHS to expand the depth of research involving the analysis of the compiled data repository and on-going recording of observable anomalies reiterating Senator Reid's desire to transition the program into a SAP to continue the research in greater depth.
In May 2011, Dr. Tara O'Toole, Undersecretary of the Office of S&T (U/SST), was presented with the AATI program information concerning the opportunity to investigate, identify and analyze sensitive advanced materials and technologies and to assess potential emerging and/or disruptive scientific and technical data of potential importance to national security. Based on available information and review of security requirements, the U/SST authorized SPO to establish an unacknowledged, waived prospective special access program, which was designated KONA BLUE. In addition, in Oct 2011, Dr O'Toole met with Senator Lieberman, Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and Senator Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader, to discuss the program funding. Additional information on the DIA-Sponsored program is at Encl 1, 2, and 3.

(U) Discussion

(TS/KB/AT) Based upon discovery and investigative discussions, interviews, and briefings with former AATI program participants, DHS S&T proposes to provide Special Access Program management support for this Congressional interest item. A SAP is proposed as we have been informed that there is a body of previous work held by other entities that requires a SAP level classification to access it.

(TS/KB/AT) The proposed program management will entail the scientific analysis and assessment of a body of sensitive information and observed anomalies to identify and anticipate potential threats to and opportunities for the security of the U.S. homeland. The S&T Special Projects office will provide program management for 12 months to allow the compilation, review, and assessment of associated unclassified and classified archived data and available literature, data bases, and physical materials from previous government and private entity efforts in order to assess possible research and development thrusts related to potential threats to national security and opportunities to enhance national security. Upon completion of the one year effort, a DHS S&T research council, to be established, will review all findings and provide a recommendation as to whether continued DHS involvement supports the Department’s and the S&T Directorate’s focus and mission requirements. See Encl 4, Proposed Statement of Objectives.

(U) Recommendation

(TS/KB/AT) Approve KONA BLUE as a DHS S&T SAP.

Approve/date_________________ Disapprove/date_________________

Modify/date_________________ Needs discussion/date_________________

Coordination: SAPCO______________ Date_________________

Enclosures.
Encl 1. AATI Program History, dated 23 Nov 2011
Encl 2. Correspondence from Senator Reid to the Honorable William Lynn, Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 24 June, 2009.
Encl 3. (undated) Info Memo, Subject: AATI Program/U-10-2552/CE, from LTG Burgess to DoD U/S for AT&L.
Encl 4. DHS KONA BLUE 12 Month Proposed Statement of Objectives.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary

THRU: Dr. Tara O'Toole, Under Secretary for Science & Technology

FROM: Mr. Steven J. Cover, Chief, Special Access Program Control Office

SUBJECT: Termination of a DHS Science & Technology “Prospective: Special Access Program (PSAP)” (U)

REFERENCE:


In accordance with DHS Directive Number 140-04, the Deputy Secretary renders all final decisions for the establishment or disposition of all Special Access Programs within the Department. This memorandum memorializes the decision of Deputy Secretary Lute, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Special Access Program Oversight Committee (SAPOC), to terminate the Science & Technology Prospective Special Access Program (PSAP) KONA BLUE.

The KONA BLUE Prospective Special Access Program was established by Under Secretary for Science & Technology Tara O'Toole on July 11, 2011. Since that date, the Special Access Program Control Office (SAPCO) and the PSAP’s Program Manager have worked to develop the SAP proposal for presentation to the SAPOC. On December 8, 2011, a progress review of the PSAP was conducted in the office of the Deputy Secretary. In attendance were Deputy Secretary Lute; General Counsel Fong; Under Secretary Wagner; SAPCO Chief Cover; and Associate General Counsel Kronisch. Under Secretary O'Toole was invited but was unable to attend.

The discussion began with SAPCO Chief Cover providing an update on recent activities undertaken and information gathered regarding the PSAP, followed by General Counsel Fong and Under Secretary Wagner providing the perspectives on the proposal. Deputy Secretary Lute then led a discussion of the proposal during which various questions about the proposal were identified and considered. Those questions included whether the justifications for establishment as a SAP (e.g., assessment of threat/vulnerability) were adequate and whether the development of a
number of required elements of the proposal, including the budget and personnel requirements, was sufficient. At the conclusion of the discussion, Deputy Secretary Lute directed that the PSAP be terminated immediately.

Pursuant to the above direction, the Special Access Program Control Office, in coordination with the assigned S&T Program Manager will ensure that all appropriate actions are taken to debrief all accessed individuals and archive all materials generated in conjunction with the planning of the KONA BLUE Prospective Special Access Program.

Approve/date

Disapprove/date 2-10-12

Modify/date

Needs discussion/date

Coordination: SAPCO

Date 1/5/12
June 5, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Mr. Steven J. Cover, DHS SAPCO

SUBJECT: Termination of DHS S&T Prospective Special Access Program (PSAP)

(S//KBNF) The Deputy Secretary made the determination that DHS was not going to execute activities proposed for the DHS S&T PSAP KONA BLUE. In conjunction with the General Counsel it was decided that the Program as proposed did not require extraordinary security measures and terminated all activities within the Department and further directed the SAPCO to initiate appropriate Program close-down procedures.

(S//KBNF) The KONA BLUE PSAP was approved prior to the issuance of any final formal documentation such as a security classification guide, SOP, facility accreditation, AIS plan or any other required documentation. No documentation exists to downgrade, reclassify or determine other disposition.

(S//KBNF) The SAPCO office as made the determination that all personnel briefed to KB PSAP will be administratively debriefed on the above date. No other documentation or paperwork would be required. All inquiries can be directed to the HQ SAPCO office.
Honorable William Lynn III  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
1010 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Secretary Lynn:

Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence Agency assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects.

Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AATIP) and study were first commissioned, much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the AATIP.

In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to future systems involving space flight, weapons, communications, and propulsion, the standard management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are properly secured. Although not every aspect of AATIP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level:

- The methodology used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer the advanced technologies associated with AATIP.
  - Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).
- Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.

- Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight.
  - Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.

  - Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.

  - Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP.

  - Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public awareness of an industry’s AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry’s further participation with the U.S. Government in this program.

- Application and engineering.
  - The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected, engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval. These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic decisions by restricting access to the “big picture” or overall intent of the program to those on a strict Bigoted List.

  - Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts within the world of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravitics, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be used with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of operational security and read-on discretion is required.

Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a small, specialized group of DoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (see Attachment 1). These individuals all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support to AATIP.
Ultimately, the results of AATIP will not only benefit the U.S. Government but I believe will directly benefit DoD in ways not yet imagined. The technological insight and capability gained will provide the U.S. with a distinct advantage over any foreign threats and allow the U.S. to maintain its preeminence as a world leader.

Thank you in advance from your time and consideration of this request. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact [redacted].

Sincerely,

[Signature]

HARRY REID
United States Senator
Attachment 1

Sponsoring Agency: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

Component-level SAP Central Office: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

Unclassified Nickname: Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP)

Program Length: FY09-FY13 (Preliminary)

Program Funding: FY09-O&M, FY10-FY13-TBD

SAP Category Designation: Intelligence, DoD Acquisition

FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Government Personnel:

- 1. Honorable William Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gov't)
- 2. Honorable Senator Harry Reid of Nevada (Gov't)
- 3. Honorable Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii (Gov't)
- 4. Robert T. Herbert (U.S. Senate)
- 5. [Redacted]
- 6. [Redacted]
- 7. [Redacted]
- 8. ONI (USN)
- 9. ONI (USMC)
- 10. USDI (Gov't)
- 11. USDI (Gov't)

FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Contractor Personnel funded under the AATIP:

- 1. [Redacted] Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies LLC (BAASS), (CTR)
- 2. [Redacted] BAASS (CTR)
- 3. [Redacted] BAASS (CTR)

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemptions 1 and 5 apply.
INFO MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

FROM: Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Lieutenant General, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program

(U//FOUO) The Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program was first sponsored in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Defense Supplemental Appropriation Act by Senators Reid and Inouye with a $10 million add. The purpose of this congressional add was to investigate foreign advanced aerospace weapon threats from the present out to the next 40 years and to build an infrastructure to house a center of expertise on advanced aerospace technologies. The potential threat posed by unconventional or “leap” aerospace vehicles that could pose national security implications for the United States was a specific area of interest.

(U//FOUO) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published a request for proposal (RFP). The RFP identified twelve technical areas to be studied: lift, propulsion; control; armament; signatures reduction; materials; configuration; power generation; temporal translation; human effects; human interface; and technology integration. DIA awarded a contract to the Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies LLC (BAASS), the only bid, headquartered in North Las Vegas, Nevada.

(U//FOUO) BAASS identified and worked with academics and scientists to produce 26 technical reports by June, 2009. All of these reports were delivered to DIA by September, 2009. A list of these first 26 technical reports is enclosure 1. One of the 26 reports, titled Advanced Space Propulsion Based on Vacuum (Spacetime Metric) Engineering was published in March, 2010. It is included as enclosure 2 and is provided as an example of reports.

(U) The FY 2010 Defense Appropriations Act included a $12 million add for the project. Twelve additional reports were produced and delivered. They are also included in enclosure 1.
On June 24, 2009, Senator Reid sent a letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn requesting the Department of Defense establish an alternate compensatory control measure (ACCM) or sensitive access program (SAP) for this project. In November, 2009, at the request of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, DIA completed a review of the program. The Agency determined that, based on classification levels of current and projected deliverables, insufficient grounds existed to classify the program, invoke an ACCM, or establish a restricted SAP.

In November, 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn and I met with Senator Reid to discuss this program. At that time, we determined the reports were of limited value to DIA. However, I did suggest they could be of merit to other organizations and, that upon the completion of the DIA contract, the project could be transitioned to another agency or component better suited to oversee the project.

2 enclosures: a/s